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THE INS AND OUTS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
By Justice Haslett P. Burke of the Supreme Court of Colorado
Address Before the Denver Bar Association, Delivered October 6, 1930

R. PRESIDENT, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Denver Bar: I appear here today with considerable reluctance, and only after repeated invitations from your
President and his predecessor, with their expressed conviction
that I might be able to say something which would promote
that confidence and mutual helpfulness between bench and
bar so essential to the administration of justice.
Let me first revert to my subject, because, as Chauncey
Depew used to say, it will not be mentioned again in the course
of my remarks. It has no relation to the daily trials and tribulations of a lawyer, his professional victories and defeats, or
the sliding scale of his compensation. Its applicability is to
that devious and difficult pathway up which he climbs to the
law, and the broad, smooth pavement down which he slides
to professional extinction. Dryden, translating and elaborating Virgil, says:
"The road to hell is open night and day,
Smooth the descent and easy is the way."
As your President has said, we have here as our guests
today the survivors of the last conflict between applicants for
admission, and the bar committee and the court. It was almost as disastrous as the Charge of the Light Brigade. Seventy-one entered that contest. The committee recommended
the admission of but 41, and five of those only under a suspension of one of their rules. The court was unable to approve
of that suspension, so the number actually admitted was 36.
That high rate of mortality has caused some surprise, and the
opinion has been expressed that the test must have been unduly
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severe or the examiners unnecessarily cruel. Neither is true.
We are, in fact, much more saddened by such a result than the
disappointed applicants can be. They look at it from the standpoint of the individual, we from the standpoint of the mass.
Think for a moment, if these 35 aspirants who failed should
now abandon their ambitions and turn their attention to other
pursuits. Assume that they have each spent three years in
preparation for the law, at an annual outlay of $600, and that
the accumulations of those years will be valueless in the activities in which they now engage. There has then been squandered more than $60,000 of treasure, and over a hundred years
of human life-and money is so scarce and life so short, Can
anyone suspect that, with a consciousness of such possible results, the members of the committee or of the court will always
feel perfectly confident of the correctness of their judgments?
"Thy memories, Power, are solemn."
I wish you to bear in mind that there is no crying demand
for a new supply to fill the depleted ranks of this profession.
This country has more lawyers than can possibly be absorbed
in its business. In the United States the average ratio to population-and all these figures I give are approximations, because I speak from memory-is 1 to 800, according to the
latest available figures. The average ratio in Colorado is I
to 600. And that condition is getting worse. Among the most
deplorable conditions are those to be found in the States of
New York and California. In the great State of Pennsylvania
there are only half as many lawyers per population as in Colorado. We know, from the observations of years, that out of
every large class that starts to travel this road, perhaps fifty
per cent are doomed to failure from the start. I trust there
may yet be found a way to at least sound a warning before
these hopeless ones enter upon an expenditure of time and
money in preparation for a profession for which they are
wholly unfit. Many of them soon fall by the wayside. Others
are literally worn out in the struggle and quit. Others hang
on to old age, living upon a pittance. Somebody ought at the
start to point out the rocks in this highway, and I fear that it
is up to the courts of last resort of these states, and their committees, to perform that duty.
Let me tell you a story. Our rules, as you know, provide
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that one who has failed to pass an examination may take the
next. If he then fails he must wait for a year. If he fails
again he can return only by special permission of the court.
Not so long ago we had a case of that kind. The court, as you
perhaps know, has a committee on admission and discipline,
of which at that time Judge Denison and I were the members.
The court directed us, when this young man's application was
made, to have a conference with him and report whether, in
our judgment, he ought to be permitted to take another examination. He came to this city and we spent some two hours
with him. Near the close of that conference I put to him this
question: "I wish you would give me the title of a book which
is a favorite of yours, the name of its author, and tell me
whether it is poetry, philosophy, essays, biography or history.
It must not be a law book." He was 27 years old. He floundered for quite a time, but finally gave the names of some books
and some authors. In some instances he connected these correctly, in some he guessed the subject of the volume, but in no
case was he correct on title, author and subject. What hope
can there be in this profession for one who comes to it at such
an age so equipped?
Twenty-four years ago a rule was passed by the Supreme
Court of this State specifying certain qualifications which one
must have to be permitted to take an examination for admission to the bar. They were very brief, but one of them was
that he must have studied law, some place, for three years.
Twenty-four years ago that was a long step in advance of most
of the states of this Union, and great credit is due the men
who established those regulations. Those rules remained unchanged for a quarter of a century, in face of the advance that
was made throughout the Union. We found this condition
when the rules of 1924 were passed. One, if he had no certificate or diploma from a recognized educational institution,
might take an examination before the State Superintendent
of Public Instruction in seven specified subjects, at the time
when an examination was given for certificates to teach school.
But there was no relation between these subjects and the other
subjects upon which the State Superintendent or her assistants
examined applicants. There was no provision as to whether
one question or a thousand should be asked, or one per cent or
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one hundred attained. Good character was to be determined
in one instance by a certificate, not even an affidavit, to that
effect from some lawyer in the town where the applicant lived.
In another, by "other satisfactory evidence."
You know the program, backed by the American Bar association and supported by the profession and the public generally, for a raising of these standards. Your court and its
committee have endeavored to set such standards in Colorado
as shall represent the ideals of the best men in a great profession. In the face of what I have said, it is folly to hope or
wish that these standards will be lowered, or that it will be
any easier to make the hurdles in the future than it has been
in the past. In fact, I think you may reasonably expect the
contrary. At least one of the states and two Canadian provinces now require a college degree as a prerequisite to the study
of law, and my guess is that the time is not far distant when
that requirement will be made in this jurisdiction. Whoever
comes to the practice of the law with no education outside of
that required to pass an examination in legal subjects can never
hope to be anything but a hewer of wood and a drawer of
water. There is no knowledge a man can acquire that will
not be of service in this profession. But he must know something of the appearance and disappearance of races, of the rise
and fall of nations, of the development and decay of civic and
social institutions, since mankind first came out of the mists.
Above all, he must have some comprehension of the wonders
wrought by words, some inkling of the beauty and power of
that noble literature whose source lies back of Homer, and
whose currents have bathed with glory every civilization that
has ever been worthy to live. For myself, I do not care how
or where a young man acquires knowledge and character. It
may be in school or college or university, in shop or field or
mine, or by the lonely lamp of the humblest cottage in this
land. The question is, how are we to find out that he has them?
The court has no machinery to do the work and no facilities
for creating it. It is folly to say that even so able a committee
as ours could ascertain those things in two or three days' examination. Hence, we have established schools as the proper
agencies to make the test, and where there is a doubt we place
the responsibility where it ought to rest, upon the great Uni-
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versity of the State of Colorado. I know very well a man may
haunt the classic halls of learning acquiring honors and degrees until, in the language of Holmes, his name
" * * * may flaunt a titled trail
Long as a cockerel's rainbow tail,"
and yet remain a knave and a fool. On the other hand, that
name may
" * * * as brief appendix wear
As Tam O'Shanter's luckless mare,"
and the owner of it be a saint and a sage. But the overwhelming probabilities are against such conclusions, and, excepting
in the science of mathematics, all we can deal with in this
world is probabilities. So when a boy comes knocking at the
doors of this profession it should be with the presumption in
his favor that he has both the character and intellect which
the completion of a university course naturally implies.
So much for the "ins" of the profession. Let me talk to
you a little about the "outs".
In order to do that, I am going to divide the history of
this state into two periods, the first fifty years of her existence
and the last four. You know we have a grievance committee
that seems to have been a little active in these the last few
years, and I am told that some members of the bar whose
footprints have been found too close to the border of the
reservation, have raised the question, why all this new machinery, and why all this tampering with ancient privileges?
Let us answer that. In the first fifty years of Colorado's history there were 41 proceedings in discipline filed in the Supreme Court of this state. In order that you may better understand the situation, I should add that during the first 22
years there were none. If that raises in your mind the supposition that learning was so profound and ethical standards
so high during those days that no such proceedings were necessary, then just avail yourselves of the opportunity to join
some of the veterans of the profession who lived here in those
days, when they are at ease around a pleasant hearth some
evening, and listen to their stories, and you will come to the
conclusion that the only offense for which a man would have
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been disbarred in those days was unprovoked murder (laughter), and that if he committed one they just took him out and
hung him and obviated the necessity of proceedings in disbarment. That is no reflection, remember, upon that generation.
It furnished us something we can no longer furnish for ourselves. There was a condition of civilization here on the crest
of the continent which soon buried incompetents, and brought
ability and genius and character to the surface, and placed
upon them the stamp from which we may know the gold.
Those times have changed; we must supply that process with
something else. They began to supply it themselves 22 years
after the admission of the state. Then came, between then
and 1926, these 41 proceedings in discipline in the Supreme
Court. They reveal a very interesting history, and I recite
the facts to you purely as a matter of history. Far be it from
me to place the blame, if they carry blame, upon the shoulders
or court or counsel or bar, or even, to suggest that there was
cause for censure. We are not much concerned with it now,
because those fellows belong to a day that has long since passed
into history.
Out of the 41, one was suspended and 22 disbarred. I
will not go into the various methods by which the others
passed from the memory of man. Of the 22 who were disbarred, six were later reinstated. The longest any one of the
six was out was six years. Two were out for five years, one
for three years, and one never got to draw a breath outside the
profession, because the opinion of the court which disbarred
him reinstated him. In one instance it took three years and
seven months from the date of the filing of the information to
reach final judgment of disbarment, and the respondent was
reinstated in three years and four months. I will not go into
the time taken for these hearings, except to tell you that the
average time consumed in the 23, between information and
judgment, was two and one-half years.
Note now the cases of some respondents who never
reached the ultimate disaster. One was pending for 14 years,
another for 11 years, another for 20 years. Five of these men
died awaiting final disposition of their cases. One case stood
at issue for 14 years, and was finally dismissed by the court for
want of prosecution. Another stood at issue for 20 years, and
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was finally dismissed by the court for want of prosecution. In
another a motion for additional time to take evidence was denied in 1902, and the case is still undisposed of on the docket
of the court.
Contemplating the history I have just recited, and remembering that lawyers as a class have not always been so
popular as to tax the vocabularies of those who constantly
sought to pay them tribute, is it not self-evident that more
careful attention to the affairs of its own household was demanded of the bar of Colorado?
I call your attention to another interesting fact: although
from the date of the admission of Colorado to statehood the
duty has devolved upon the Supreme Court of this State to
govern its bar, admit, discipline, and disbar, and although that
tribunal has been ostensibly vested with that power over a
group of men now grown I think to something like 2500, and
composed, if their detractors may be credited, of as desperate
and shifty a group of individuals as ever lived, the elderly,
peace-loving gentlemen who have comprised that tribunal
have never been furnished with a horse or a weapon or a penny
with which to discharge that desperate duty. How any one
should imagine, up until recent years, that it were possible for
the court to so function, it is impossible for me to understand.
About 1924, by rule, the court levied a per capita tax, known
as an examination fee, of ten dollars per head upon all applicants for admission to the bar, and made it impossible to obtain a refund. Out of those fees it created a fund which it
devoted to examinations, admissions and discipline. So the
court is not quite so helpless as it used to be. No rule of court
had been passed during all those preceding years, and no statute had been passed, directing how that tremendous power
should be exercised, or under what circumstances, except in a
single instance. Prior to 1922-the oath taken was simply an
oath to obey the constitution and discharge the duties of office
to the best of the applicant's ability. In 1922 the present oath
was prescribed by rule. It has an interesting history. You
know that it was recommended by the American Bar Association; the American Bar Association took it from the Territorial laws of Washington of 1863; Washington got it from
the Swiss Cantons of Geneva, and you will find its substance
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in briefest language in the Code of old King Christian 5th of
Denmark and Norway, under date of 1683. How much further back you may follow it I am not able to say. Eighteen
months after it was prescribed its obligation was, by an amendment of the rule, cast upon every member of the bar in this
jurisdiction, the rule providing that any conduct inconsistent
with its principles should be cause for discipline. Then for
the first time some rules were adopted concerning the discipline of allegedly recreant lawyers. The Grievance Committee of the State Bar Association, your committee, was
adopted by the court as one of its arms for that purpose, and
its procedure, where it so acted, roughly outlined. It was the
first long step toward bringing into closer contact, into working harmony, the courts of this state and the bar of this state,
and its tendency has been to bring in the trial courts of the
state as well, I assure you.
Before I pass to the work of that committee, just a word
about rumored criticism of the results. Since this so-called
Code was enacted, there seems to have gotten abroad among
certain members of the bar an impression that there is now
no other method of proceeding against a lawyer for offenses
against the courts, the people or the profession. It seems to
me there could not be a greater fallacy. What was the condition before that rule was adopted? The court was authorized by statute to strike from the rolls the name of any lawyer
guilty of mal-conduct in office, and that was the end of the
regulation. How the matter should be presented to the court,
how the court should act, what kind of a hearing should be
given, was all a white page. Not even a disbarable offense
was specified, except the one mentioned in the Territorial
statutes of 1861, that if an attorney refused to pay money to
his client which belonged to the client, his name should be
stricken from the rolls. And the language of the act was, if
he had "neglected" to pay the money. Of course it seems clear
that there were numerous ways to proceed in those disbarment
cases before these rules were passed. Let us take two of them,
we need not notice others. This territorial statute simply provided that if the neglect was called to the attention of the court,
it might by rule require the attorney to show cause why his
name should not be stricken. That was all there was to that
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procedure. Certainly up until these new rules were adopted,
one way of proceeding against a lawyer was by affidavit filed
with the court, which would set the rule in motion. Now,
another way unquestionably was, at least it has been repeatedly
followed, by record, if a court record disclosed misconduct.
Suppose, for instance, that briefs are filed in the Supreme
Court, and upon an examination of them we find that the
president of your Association has filed a brief on. each side of
the case, that he has appeared for the plaintiff in error and for
the defendant in error. What is there to refer to a bar association? What is there to refer to a grievance committee?
What is there to require an affidavit? So I assume that there
were at least two recognized methods of procedure, one by
affidavit and one by rule, to show cause on a matter that appeared of record. We know also that before that time people filed complaints with the State Bar Association. Those
complaints were referred to the Grievance Committee, and
were there threshed out. Sometimes they heard the respondent, maybe always heard him, and eventually, coming from
the Grievance Committee those cases reached the court in substantially the same condition they would have reached it had
some private individual of his own motion filed the affidavit
direct. Now, since there is not a word in the rules about the
method there laid down being an exclusive method, I opine
that these other methods which existed before the adoption of
the rules still exist. Are they hard? Are they unjust? They
may be. And because they may be, you may naturally expect
that the court would, as it does, resort to them now only in
cases of emergency. But are they harsher than other necessary rules of law? A man may be required, without an opportunity to be heard, without a perfectly valid defense which
he has ever being presented-he may be required publicly to
show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice
of his profession for an apparently heinous offense. And that
is sad, if it ever happens. But the same man may, upon identically the same showing, be called into a trial court to answer
a charge of murder, on an information filed by a district attorney based upon an affidavit of a man whom the defendant
considers, and many other people consider, absolutely unworthy of credence. So district attorneys, if they are good
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prosecuters, are very careful about how they exercise that tremendous power; and I should venture the suggestion that if,
as I have indicated, the power exists, the Supreme Court of
Colorado will never exercise it except in cases which seem to
it to imply necessity.
Now, what has your Committee been doing since it was
adopted as one of the arms of the court? It has had 16 cases
to handle that have come to public attention by reason of finding their way into the court records. In five of those cases
there have been entered judgments of disbarment; in two of
them reprimands by the court; in two suspensions. Six are
still pending. What about those that have been disposed of?
I am not going into details as to each one, but the record discloses that the average time elapsing from the date of the filing
of the information to the date of the judgment has been four
and one-half months. In addition to those, there have been
reprimands in one or two instances, one that I recall at least,
by some member of the court for the court, in! a case that never
came to the attention of the Bar Association or its Grievance
Committee, until perhaps three or four days ago, when I told
the story to the present President of the State Bar Association.
There have been numerous instances in which a proper admonition was given by the Committee, or one of its officers,
and the proceeding never became a matter of record, even
before the Committee.
You will be interested in knowing too, that in approximately ninety per cent of the cases filed with the Grievance
Committee, that is, letters written or complaint made, no action is ever taken publicly; they end there. Young men who
have made a false step; men whom financial distress has caused
to commit minor offenses; men with otherwise excellent records. I know of their existence only by the report to me
generally of the Secretary of the Committee. It is interesting
also to know that in approximately 98 per cent of the cases
filed, whether they become public or not, the offense charged
is an offense involving money, cases where lawyers have withheld money from their clients for an unreasonable length of
time, probably used it; young men walking unfamiliar paths,
worried over where tomorrow's meals are coming from, have
taken business which they never ought to have taken, or
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attempted to improperly prosecute business properly taken.
They are tragedies to move a heart of stone; they are enough
to make every self-supporting, reasonably equipped member
of this bar devote some of his time and some of his thought to
reducing the probabilities that men will enter upon a profession for which they are wholly unfitted by nature and by education, and in which they must fall into trouble. The fault is
not theirs; the fault lies with the system; it lies with the law
schools, that take their money when they never ought to take
their money; it lies with colleges and universities, that graduate these men in order to get them out where they have stayed
too long; it lies with the inefficient machinery which we have
been able to set up thus far to determine who has the qualifications to enter upon, the practice of this great professon.
Now, I must begin to close. Why all this fuss? We constantly hear of the ancient power and prestige of the bar and
its modern decadence. I doubt a dood deal of it. Because, as
you look into the distance, only the mountain peaks loom up.
In your immediate vicinity the foothills shut off the main
range. I have no doubt that those of us who live 30 years from
now will point out the giants in this gathering to their successors, and tell those successors stories of the golden days of
the profession that have forever passed. But there are troubles.
The wisest and most truthful of our elders tell us that the path
has twisted too much and has been turning downward. If so,
we must about face and begin to climb again. That means
that all of this work must be done by someone. It cannot be
done alone by a court or a committee. It is just as useless to
attempt it as it is to attempt to move the Rocky Mountains.
It is work for the bar as a whole in a great jurisdiction, a bar
that has some pride in itself, pride in its history, hope for its
future. Nobody else can do it. The committee, your committee, the court, your court, must have these matters understood by you, and have the support of the best character and
the best brains at this bar. What does your court wish to do?
I think I can best tell you by repeating what I said to a young
man who had stepped aside from the path of rectitude, and
whom, out of great tenderness, the court was trying to win
back without disgrace. When he asked me what the hope of
the court was, I said, the court, if possible, would have the bar
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of Colorado so conduct herself that when one of her members
stands up in any court in the civilized world, and it is known
that he comes from this jurisdiction, every presumption as to
his character, his learning and his ability will be instantly in-

dulged. It may be an idle dream, I know, but I would have
a certificate of admission to the bar in Colorado coveted and
treasured as a patent of nobility.

A COLLECTION
The following letter by a Justice of the Peace was received in the regular course
of business by the client of a Denver attorney:
West Monroe, La., 2nd April, 1924.
Shipman-Ward Mfg. Co.
Gentlemen:
I am once more sending you papers in the matter of Miss ................. This woman
has given me more trouble to try and collect money from than any person I ever tried
before. Last summer I traced her all over the United States before I could locate
her. And now she has gone again and I have enough and am quitting her trail, and
am going to start you after her. Last fall some time she paid me ten dollars on her
account and SWORE that she would pay me ten dollars per month until it was all
paid. But she Lied instead of paying. She got MARRIED and left. I never saw
the man she married but I know that he is a sorry cuss. I traced them up and wrote
to him and her and I know that both of them got my letters for they never came back,
but they never answered my letters, paid no attention to them and any man that would
do that is a dam rascal. I am sending you check for five dollars, out of the ten. I
would not go through with what I have done trying to collect, what I have for ten
dollars much less five. JUST as soon as you get this I want you to get some one right
after them and push it. GIVE them all the worry and trouble you can. I am sending
you a letter that a friend of mine sent me their address in. I am simply sending it
so as you can see that I was camping on their trail all the time. Now I want you to
get after them just as soon as you can. SUE THE HELL OUT OF THEM. Get you
a judgment then you can do something with them. You will never be able to do anything with just the account.
THEIR ADDRESS NOW IS MRS .................
DENVER, COLORADO.

,

18TH AND

SHERMAN AVE.,

Now go after them.
Yours very truly,
R. W. MCCLENDON.

MINERAL LEASES BY TENANTS
IN COMMON
By Kent S. Whitford of the Denver Bar*
HIS paper deals with certain phases of the above subject as related principally to the law of oil and gas, although some cases are presented relating to coal and the
metalliferous minerals.
Ownership of land by tenancy in common has in legal history been the source of much litigation between co-tenants
who, being human, could not agree among themselves or with
others as to the method of managing their estates or as to their
relative rights, duties and liabilities as such co-tenants, and
while the general principles of co-tenancy have by this time
been well settled, their application is still, of course, the source
of litigation. When the co-tenant found himself the co-owner
of valuable mineral or oil land, and saw the golden apples of
wealth dangle tantalizingly from the tree, and others having
colorable adverse claims, or contractual relations, also viewed
the fruit with appraising eye, litigation was inevitable; and
since in this country our oil and mineral law is mainly the
growth of half a century, under stress of large fortunes at stake,
and with new applications to be made of legal principles, or
new principles to be established, it is not surprising that we
find Court decisions not in harmony, and text book statements
lacking in dependability.
As a starting point and principal subject of this discussion
we state interrogatively one of the perplexing questions arising
in oil and gas law, viz.: what are the rights of an oil and gas
lessee who leases from a number of tenants in common of oil
and gas lands where there are other tenants in common who
have not joined in the lease or in any way ratified it? What
are the rights of the lessee in respect of drilling and developing the property and what are the rights of the non-consenting
tenants in common?
As a practical proposition, this question arises principally
in two situations; first where the owners of the land are heirs
at law or devisees of a decedent; and second, where a person
has leased his land for oil and gas development and, desiring
*A paper presented before the Law Club of Denver.
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to realize some cash on the venture, has proceeded to sell off
some of his reserved royalty under the lease. This is usually
done by means of what is called a mineral deed, which commonly is the absolute conveyance by fee simple title, of an undivided interest in the mineral estate, subject to an existing
lease, including an undivided interest in the lessor's rights
under the lease, whereby the grantee obtains not only a royalty
right under the lease but an undivided interest in the reversion
in fee, or for a term of years. The lease becomes forfeited,
expires or is surrendered, and a second lessee desires to lease
the lands. The second lessee is therefore confronted with the
necessity of obtaining a lease from the original land owner and
all the holders of the mineral deeds. The average lawyer may
occasionally run into a situation of this kind either on behalf
of a client who happens to be engaged in oil and gas or other
mineral development, or a land owner owning lands having
prospective value for mineral, or one who speculates in oil and
gas royalties or buys and sells oil and gas leases for profit.
The fundamental doctrine of the common law is that
where persons own lands as tenants in common, each tenant
has the right to the use of the land without interference by his
cotenants so long as he does not interfere with their like use
and enjoyment of the land. This would seem to be a very simple statement of a very simple proposition of law, and seems
to have worked out more or less clearly and satisfactorily so
far as agricultural lands are concerned, but when we come to
consider the rights of tenants in common in mineral lands we
are confronted with some practical difficulties. This peculiarly applies to oil and gas lands. It would seem that an extension of this doctrine as stated would produce as a corollary
the principle that each tenant in common could go on the land,
drill as many wells for oil and gas as he saw fit, and appropriate all the product which he therein found, so long as he
did not interfere with the right of his cotenant likewise to go
on the land and drill for oil and gas. This obviously would
make it necessary for a tenant in common to drill wells if he
would protect his interests against that of his cotenant. It
would result in the wasteful expenditure of money in drilling
duplicate wells, and the practical result would be that the tenant in common who had the largest bank account and the best
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facilities, equipment and organization for drilling, would get
the lion's share of the estate. Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 Sou.
(La.) 720.
The statement in some decisions seems to be that at common law, one cotenant can not take more than his share, and
the statute of 4 and S Anne, Chapter 16, Sec. 27, seems to give
the right to a cotenant to bring an action for account against a
cotenant receiving more than his share, particularly as applied
to rents and profits. It seems that by the statute of Westminister, 13 Edward the First, cotenants are made liable to their
cotenants for account, although Mr. Lindley in his excellent
work on Mines, definitely holds that at common law, tenants
in common of the freehold are not liable for account. Faris v.
Montgomery, 10 Sou. (Ala.) 607, 33 Am. Rep. 146.
We are then brought to the proposition, what happens in
case one or more of the cotenants instead of themselves making
the development, lease to another the land for development
purposes? The cradle of the law of oil and gas is in the state
of Pennsylvania, as being the state wherein oil and gas wells
were first discovered. There we would naturally expect to
find those well reasoned decisions which are the leading cases
that are followed everywhere. On account, however, of the
early lack of scientific understanding of the people and oil
operators as to the exact nature and occurrence and characteristics of oil and gas, this lack of understanding has found its
way to the courts and the confusion of fact quite naturally has
produced a confusion of law on many of the most important
and fundamental questions surrounding the subject of oil and
gas, which midnight of confusion has finally melted into a
condition of comparative clarity by the more recent decisions.
Oil and gas has always been recognized as a mineral and
it is elementary that mineral in the ground is a part and parcel
of the soil. Since the development for oil and gas or coal and
other mineral involved the capturing of that substance, severing it from the soil and carrying it away, it was held by the
early decisions to be a destruction of the estate, in other words
an unlawful waste, and hence where one cotenant or his lessee
did this, it was held to be an invasion of the rights of the nonconsenting cotenants. Murray v. Haverty, 70 Ill. 318; Dangerfield v. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 554; Stewart v. Tennant,44
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S.E. (W. Va.) 223; Abbey v. Wheeler, 62 N. E. (N.Y.) 1074.
A lease for oil and gas by one or more cotenants was held
to be valid as to his interest, but void as to the interests of the
non-consenting cotenants, and a trespass as to their rights. It
was held that he who was merely a cotenant could not himself
exhaust or destroy the estate to the prejudice of his cotenants,
and hence he could not convey that right to another. A number of cases have held that the non-consenting cotenants could
enjoin the lessee from proceeding with such operations, Williamson v. Jones, 9 S. E. 436, 25 L.R.A. 222, and where he
had proceeded with the operations could enjoin future operations. South Penn. v. Haught,78 S.E. (W. Va.) 259. By way
of alternative remedy, it has been held that the lessee can be
held for damages as an absolute trespasser, and that the measure of damages is the full proportionate share in the mineral
extracted equal to the fractional estate of the non-consenting
cotenants. Siegler v. Brenneman, 86 N.E. (Ill.) 597; South
Penn. v. Haught, 78 S.E. (W. Va.) 259. In other words the
lessee would have to pay the non-consenting cotenants in effect
100% royalty on their interest.
In some of the later decisions in certain jurisdictions, it
was recognized that the rule of damages for trespass as above
set forth worked a hardship on the lessee in certain instances
and was inequitable and unfair, and so the rule of damages was
adopted in accordance with the present practice in Colorado
in the case of trespass by carrying away ore from mining
claims, namely that where the trespasser proceeded innocently
and in good faith without knowing that there were outstanding
interests of cotenants, the measure of damages is the value of
the objecting cotenant's share of mineral in place in the
ground. Whereas if the trespass is wilful or wanton, the measure of damages is the value of the objecting cotenant's share
after it has been extracted. Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v.
MoorheadMining Co., 145 Pac. 686; L. B. G. M. Co. v. S. U.
M. Co., 203 Fed. 795 ; Bender v. Brooks, 127 S.W. (Tex.) 171;
Hady City Oil Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., 137 S.W. (Tex.)
171. In other words, in the case of innocent trespass the trespasser may deduct from the value of the mineral mined or the
proceeds obtained by the sale of the same, the reasonable cost
of the mining, extraction and marketing of the same. Where-
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as in the case of a willful trespasser, the cotenant takes his
share of the mineral in gross, and the trespasser must pay for
all the cost of extraction out of his own pocket. Such is the
rule announced by some text books, but we are still confronted
with the question, what state of facts marks the dividing line
between the innocent and wilful trespasser, and the question
remains unanswered, as in one case failure to examine the title
was held culpable, Liberty Bell Gold Mining Co. v. Moorland Mining Co., 145 Pac. (Colo.) 686, and in another case it
was held not so to be. Findley v. Warren, 94 At. (Pa.)
Within the last fifteen or twenty years there has been quite
a change in the attitude of the courts toward this situation. It
has been apparently discovered that the conceptions of common
law relative to the rights of cotenants have been somewhat unconsciously polluted by the principles of the Roman civil law
on this situation. It is there held that no cotenant can go on
any particular spot on the land and drill a well or produce oil,
as the interest in the land is an undivided interest and that particular spot belongs just as much to all the cotenants as to the
cotenant who wishes to drill. Hence a lease by one cotenant
is void as to all the others and confers no right to drill on the
land whatever. In other words, the right of one cotenant who
wishes not to drill and develop the land is expressly held to be
superior to the rights of all the other cotenants who desire to
drill the land. Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll,82 Sou. (La.)
277; Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 Sou. (La.) 720.
The modern decisions seem to evince a tendency to go
back and re-examine the common law doctrine of cotenants in
all its pristine purity, and they have evolved a new conception
of the rights and obligations of cotenants. It is pointed out
that the only way in which a mineral estate can be enjoyed is
by the extraction of the mineral, and hence cotenants have a
right to use and enjoy mineral lands in the way in which they
were intended to be used and enjoyed, namely by the extraction of the minerals. Therefore when one tenant goes on and
opens a coal mine or drills a well for oil and gas or discloses
the apex of a vein of precious metal or a placer bed where
mineral may be found, he is not a trespasser as against his cotenants, and the extraction of the mineral is not waste in the
sense of an unlawful actionable act. Hence if one cotenant
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has the right to develop the mineral content of the land without the consent of his cotenant, he has the right to convey or
assign or lease that right of exploration and development to
third parties. Such a lease, theoretically at least, is not binding on his other cotenants, but is binding on his own interest
and confers upon his lessee the right of development. The
mere fact that the lessee goes on the land and apparently takes
exclusive possession of it, is not a trespass against the non-consenting cotenants even though the lessee knew that there were
other cotenants who had not joined in the lease. Job v. Potton,
L. R. 20 Eq. 84, 14 Mon. Min. Rep. 329; Compton v. Peoples
Gas Co., 89 Pac. (Kan.) 1039, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 787; New Domain v. McKinney, 221 S.W. (Ky.) 245; York v. Warren Oil,
229 S.W. (Ky.) 114; Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W.
(Tex.) 330; PrairieOil & Gas v. Allen, 2 Fed. 2d (Okla.)
566; McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 Atl. (Pa.) 949; Findlay v. Warren, 94 At. (Pa.) 69. This is true so long as the lessee takes
possession, claiming the right of possession only to the extent
of the undivided interest which he holds and so long as he
openly recognizes the fact that there are outstanding interests
which he has not leased. Apparently if the lessee of one or
more cotenants has the right of possession, and can operate,
the non-consenting cotenants can not enjoin him from operating. There have been decisions where an injunction has been
denied. Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed. Sec. 790; Compton v. People Gas Co., 89 Pac. (Kan.) 1039, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 787; Prairie
Oil & Gas v. Allen, 2 Fed. 2d (Okla.) 566.
The courts in commenting on the right of a non-consenting cotenant to object, point out that very frequently the drilling of the land is necessary to prevent the supposed gas and
oil deposits from being drained away through the porous subsurface strata by wells on adjoining lands whereby the mineral
value of the land may become entirely lost without any redress,
and therefore it would be wrong to permit a cotenant who
perhaps might own but a small fractional interest, from preventing the necessary and beneficial development of the land
by the lessee of the other cotenants. Mr. Lindley points out
however that the size of the cotenant's fractional holding is no
bar to development by his lessee. Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed.
Sec. 790. Furthermore it is manifest if there be any right of
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injunction at all in the non-consenting cotenant, it must be exercised promptly when the lessee proposes to commence drilling operations, for otherwise the right will be lost by laches.
Williamson v. Jones, 11 S.E. (W.Va.) 436. It is to be noticed
that the rule of laches in mining claims is unusually strict,
owing to quick changes in values. As a practical matter injunctions are seldom asked for except possibly in terorem because a party seeing his land about to be developed is usually
willing to have it developed, and when the development
proves successful the cotenant landowner is anxious indeed to
obtain a share of the production, the more lion-like the better.
As a matter of fact it must be noticed that the actions for damages, accounting etc. by a non-consenting cotenant, amount in
a way to the ratification of the possession of the premises by
the lessee of the other cotenants.
The lessee however, by operating without the consent of
all the cotenants in common, incurs liability for an action for
accounting by the non-consenting cotenants, to the extent of
their interest. And by the most modern decisions it seems to
be the law, that whether the lessee knew or not that there were
outstanding interests, the measure of damages is the value of
the non-consenting cotenants' share of the production in place
in the ground. The rule for the measurement of this value has
resolved itself into two separate conflicting rules. There is one
line of cases that holds that the value of the non-consenting
cotenant's interest is the proportionate part of the consideration paid by the lessee for the lease, namely, the royalty. Gerkins v. Ky. Salt Co., 39 S. W. (Ky.) 444; Miller v. Powers,
184 S. W. (Ky.) 417; McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 Atl. (Pa.) 949;
Findlay v. Warren, 94 Atl. (Pa.) 69; So. Penn. vs. Haught,
78 S. E. (W. Va.) 759; (as to past production), New Domain
v. McKinney, 221 S. W. (Ky.) 245; York v. Warren Oil, 229
S. W. (Ky.) 114. Therefore if A and B own Black Acre together and B executes a lease covering said land in consideration of the sum of one dollar and one-eighth royalty on all of
the minerals produced, A upon an accounting is entitled to his
half of the one-eighth royalty. This doctrine obtains with this
proviso, that the royalty paid be a fair royalty for the lease,
the non-consenting cotenant being not bound to accept his
share of an insufficient consideration. Mercur v. State Line,
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32 At. (Pa.) 1126. However the courts have sometimes recognized that one-eighth royalty is the usual established and
prevailing royalty for that character of operations, and have
awarded non-consenting cotenants their interest on that basis.
On principle this doctrine is open to the objection that the nonconsenting cotenant is placed in exactly the same position
which he would have occupied had he signed the lease, and
no better. In other words the doctrine virtually permits one
tenant in common to lease the land and thus in effect force all
the other tenants in common into the same lease, whether they
will or no.
The other rule seems to be that one already alluded to,
namely that the lessee is compelled to pay the non-consenting
co-owners their proportionate share of the net profits after deducting the operating expenses. In other words the non-consenting cotenants have the right to their share of the value of
the product in the ground. New Domain v. McKinney, 221
S.W. (Ky.) 245; York v. Warren Oil, 229 S.W. (Ky.) 114;
Burnham v. Hardy, 147 S.W. (Tex.) 330; PrairieOil & Gas
v. Allen, 2 Fed. 2d (Okl.) 566; Crawford v. Forest Oil, 57
At. (Pa.) 46; Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 92 Sou. (La.) 720;
Martel v. Jennings, 38 Sou. (La.) 253; Johnson v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 135 Pac. (Kan.) 589, Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 549;
Job v. Potton, L.R. 20 Eq. 84, 14 Mon. Min. Rep. 329; (see
reasoning in) So. Penn. v. Haught, 78 S.E. (W. Va.) 759.
The operator can not charge the non-consenting cotenants for
the cost of dry holes or drilling or development which results
in a failure, Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. (Tex.) 330,
but he is permitted to recover the proportionate share of the
cost of drilling successful wells and the cost of producing oil
therefrom, together with the administrative, bookkeeping and
other incidental and overhead expenses connected therewith.
New Domain v. McKinney, 221 S. W. (Ky.) 245.
There are no Colorado cases on this phase of the doctrine
as applied to oil and gas. But respecting solid minerals, decisions are in harmony with the views last expressed. The occupation of the premises by one cotenant is held to be an occupation of the premises by all. Murley v. Ennis, 2 Colo. 306;
Laesch v. Morton, 87 Pac. 1081. Cotenants must not take advantage of each other and are liable to each other for the ex-
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clusive use of the property. Canfield v. Jeannotte, 72 Pac.
1062; Morton v. Laesch, 125 Pac. 498. A lease of the premises by one cotenant extends only to the interest of that cotenant, and a cotenant can, not bind the interest of his cotenants
by contract without their consent. Rico v. Musgrove, 23 Pac.
458; Charles v. Eshleman, 5 Colo. 107; Omaha v. Tabor, 21
Pac. 925; Stickley v. Mulrooney, 87 Pac. 547. A cotenant or
his lessee can not charge to or recover from the other cotenants
the cost of improvements placed on mining property unless
they be necessary for the preservation of the property under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, and also unless they
tend to increase the value of the property. Rico v. Musgrave,
23 Pac. 458; Wahl v. Larsen, 201 Pac. 48. However if a nonconsenting cotenant desires to participate in the profits of the
mining operations, the operator can charge his account with
the reasonable development costs and recover the same out of
production. Stickley v. Mulrooney, 87 Pac. 547; Wolfe v.
Childs (somewhat contra) 94 Pac. 292. A cotenant is permitted to sell his interest, and his vendee becomes a cotenant
with the other cotenants. Wanamaker v. Reno, 244 Pac. 602.
The principles above announced seem to be well settled
as applied to the metalliferous minerals. It has been held that
any tenant in common can work a mine to exhaustion and that
the same does not constitute waste; McCord v. Oakland, 27
Pac. (Cal.) 863, 49 Ann. Rep. 686; Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed.
789. That a cotenant or his lessee has a right to possess and
enjoy the property subject to the equal right of all other cotenants; Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed. 789A. That a non-consenting cotenant is not entitled to an accounting, unless this be recognized by statute or by the adoption of the statute 4 and 5
Anne into the common law of any state. Faris v. Montgomery, 10 Sou. (Ala.) 607, 33 Am. Rep. 146.
It seems to be the law that where cotenants lease to separate lessees these lessees become tenants in common as to each
other in the absence of any agreement between them. New
Domain v. McKinney, 221 S.W. (Ky.) 245. Either has the
right to go on the property and drill, mine or develop the same
subject to the liability to account to his cotenant for his operations on the basis of net profits as above indicated.
From the above it would seem that cotenants could act
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independently of each other in handling the property, but the
above seems to be about the only exception to the rule that all
must join in whatever is done.
When all of the cotenants have joined in executing a lease
on mineral lands, the owner of a 2/3 interest or any other interest is powerless to release the lessee from the performance
of any of the obligations of the lease or to waive, vary or modify the terms thereof, without the consent of all of the cotenants. Wally v. Jones, 119 Atl. 75; McGary v. Campbell,
245 S. W. (Tex.) 106. Likewise where the lease is held by
tenancy in common between two or more lessees, neither lessee
can surrender the same to the lessor without the consent of the
other. Thornton, Oil & Gas, 4th Ed. p. 794.
We now come to the question as to whether or not it is
necessary for all cotenants to join in an action to effect a forfeiture of a lease. As applied to the law of cotenancy, the general rule seems to be as announced in a Kentucky case:
"The general rule with regard to forfeiture of leases, where the lessors
are tenants in common, is that all the tenants in common must concur and
unite in an action to enforce the forfeiture on account of the breach of entire
and indivisible covenants. Such is the implied covenant in oil leases like the
one before us to develop the lease on notice."
Union Oil & Gas Co. v. Gillem, 279 S. W. (Ky.) 626.
Jameson v. Chanslor, 167 Pac. (Cal.) 369.
Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 72 Sou. (La.) 718.

This would certainly seem to be the law with regard to
forfeiture or action for cancellation for the breach of either
an implied or an express covenant to mine or drill wells or
develop the property as a whole. It would at least be true
where all of the tenants in common joined as lessors in one
lease. Whether tenants in common who have leased their interest in the land by separate instruments could, in proper case,
forfeit his instrument for a breach of the terms thereof, is open
to question. There are several interesting exceptions to the
general rule. One seems to be that where the lease itself provides expressly that a breach of any certain obligation of the
lease shall operate as a forfeiture, it has been held that this
amounts to a covenant between the tenants in common who
subscribed the lease, that the lease may be forfeited for a breach
of the covenant and therefore that less than all of the tenants
in common may enforce that right so far as it concerns their
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undivided interest. Green v. Standard Oil Go., 84 Sou. (La.)
211. In this particular case, 14 of 15 lessors sought to forfeit
the lease and the other lessor defended and resisted the forfeiture. This was a Louisiana case arising under the civil law,
and it seems there is a Louisiana statute providing for the several enforcement of joint obligations. But even in this jurisdiction it has been held that cotenants suing to cancel a lease
must make the non-joining cotenants parties defendant. North
Central v. Gulf Ref. Co., 105 Sou. (La.) 411. Such would
seem in line with the general principles of equity. It also
seems that covenants in a lease to pay rentals and royalties are
not entire covenants, but are severable covenants which can be
enforced by appropriate action by any of the cotenants entitled
to recover a portion thereof. Thus a cotenant may either in a
proper case sue to recover his proportion of a rental or royalty,
or may cancel the lease as to his undivided interest for failure
to pay the same. It also seems that where a lease by its terms
provides that the lessee may by his own act or default automatically terminate the lease, that the lessee having defaulted,
one or more of the cotenant lessors may institute an action to
cancel the terminated lease of record. This is not considered
a forfeiture in the strict sense of the word, as the lease is held
automatically terminated. Empire Gas v. Saunders, 22 Fed.
2d (Tex.) 733. Apparently this would also be so after the
lease had expired.
The greatest danger that confronts a lessee who undertakes to lease mineral lands from less than all of the cotenants,
is the danger that the lands may be partitioned. Manifestly
mineral lands are rarely susceptible of equitable division in
parcels. Therefore in most cases the court would order the
land sold and it is manifest that a sale of the property would
serve to extinguish a lease made by only a portion of the cotenants. In making such a partition it is probable that the
court would appraise the value of the oil lease and pay this to
the lessee out of the value of his lessor's share. From a practical standpoint this probably would be poor remuneration.
In one case a lessee protected himself by himself buying in the
land at the appraised value, on consent of Court. Barnes v.
Keyes, 127 Pac. (Okla.) 261, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 178, 35 Ann. Cas.
1915 A, 515.
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Foreman vs. Foreman-DecidedSeptember 29, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff had secured a divorce on the grounds of
desertion. As an award of alimony, she was given the defendant's interest to some lots. As a part of her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that she was a poor person and without means
except for a one-half interest in the lots to which the defendant
held title to the other half. Defendant filed his application to
modify the decree by setting aside the alimony award, and the
testimony showed that the plaintiff had, at that time, about
$2,000 in the bank. The trial court refused to set aside the
decree, and the defendant alleged error.
Held.-Even though the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct in swearing falsely concerning her financial condition,
the defendant, himself, had given false testimony. He did not
come into court with clean hands and he should not receive
the relief sought by him.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE COURT-PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE-CERTIORARI-

No. 1235-Foster et al vs. Nickles-Decided September
29, 1930.
Facts.-Nickles was charged with the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors. The complaint was filed before
Foster, who is a Justice of the Peace. Nickles originally
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, but before trial, he asked
leave to change his plea to one of guilty. The Justice refused
this request, whereupon, Nickles sued out a writ of certiorari
to the County Court, which court ordered that the Justice accept Nickles' plea of guilty.
Held.-It is upon the record alone that review by certiorari is had; not upon the averments in the petition for the
writ. For the writ to apply, there must be a final judgment
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in the Justice Court, and the petitioner must show injury. The
writ is not proper in this case.
Judgment reversed.
WHO Is - No.
12613-Industrial Commission, Mitchell et al vs. Aetna
Life Insurance Company et al-Decided September 29,
1930.
Facts.-Platt-Rogers were in need of trucks for a building contract for the D. & R. G. W. Ry. They called upon the
White Company for trucks, and among those supplied by the
White Company, was one which had been purchased by one
Smith. Smith had failed to pay for this truck, and the company was attempting, by its operation, to work out of it the
unpaid purchase price. This truck was driven by one Mitchell. The radiator of the truck having frozen, Mitchell was
going to the railroad station in his own car, to get a new one
which was to have been sent out by the White Company. He
was later found beneath his car in the river. Upon hearing before the referee, compensation was denied. Upon review, the
Commission entered an award against Platt-Rogers. On rehearing, the award was changed to one against the White Company. Upon taking the case to the District Court, it was held
that there was no evidence to sustain the award, whereupon
error was alleged. The following questions were presented:
(1) That there was no accident. (2) That if there was an
accident, it did not arise out of and in the course of employment. (3) That there was no employment (but if there was,
who was the employer?).
Held.-( 1) The finding by the commission that there was
an accident will not be disturbed.
(2)-(3) If an employe is pursuing the business of his employer at the time that he suffers from an accident, the injury
is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. "If a vehicle with its driver be contracted by one employer to another the driver remains in the employ of the
first." The White Company is accordingly deemed the employer in this case.
Judgment reversed with instructions.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER

DICTA
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS OF-PROPER PARTIES

-No. 12317-City vs. Morrison-DecidedSeptember 29,
1930.
Facts.-Morrison had entered into a contract with the
City and County of Denver, whereby he was to build a ditch,
and the city was to furnish the materials. The ditch having
been completed, the city refused to pay $22,237.27 which was
15% of the total under the claim that the work was done improperly. Morrison maintained that the fault was with the
materials which were furnished him by the city, and he thereupon brought this suit, to which the city filed a cross-complaint. Upon trial, judgment was had for Morrison. The
city seeks a reversal because (1) The cause of action was in
favor of the plaintiff and his partners and not in favor of the
plaintiff alone, and (2) The insufficiency of the evidence.
Held.- (1) When a contract is made with one man alone,
even though he is affiliated with others for the purposes of
carrying out the terms thereof, the contracting party may sue
in his own name.
(2) The judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed
when it is based upon conflicting testimony.
Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-

NOTICE-

SUFFICIENCY OF-

No. 12674-Royal Indemnity Company et al vs. Industrial
Commission et al-Decided October 6, 1930.
Facts.-Claimant sought compensation for the loss of
sight in one eye, as the result of an accident incurred in the
course of employment. There was a good deal of conflicting
testimony, but the commission held that the condition of the
eye was caused by the accident, and awarded compensation,
which award was sustained by the district court. The respondents contended that the award was erroneous because; (1) The
injury was not the result of an accident and (2) Notice was
not given in the time provided by the statute.
Held.-(1) The finding by the Commission that the injury was caused by an, accident was amply supported by the
evidence and it will not be disturbed.
(2) The provision of the statute which requires notice,

DICTA

does not contemplate that notice should be given by one who
is already receiving compensation. The claimant received
medical treatment at the expense of the employer. "This constituted the receipt of compensation within the meaning of
the statute, and dispensed with the necessiy of giving notice
within six months."
Judgment affirmed.
EJECTMENT-No.

12178-Reagan vs. Dick-Decided Octo-

ber 14, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff sued in ejectment. The original owner
of the premises under dispute had permitted his taxes to lapse
and the defendant had obtained the tax deed. After the tax
deed was issued to the defendant, the property was sold at a
sheriff's sale on an execution against the original owner. The
plaintiff claims under this sheriff's sale. The particular parcel of land in dispute had been platted. Both the plaintiff's
and the defendant's deeds purported to convey the North Star
Mill Site. The question presented is as to the plaintiff's right
to possession. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant alleged error.
Held.-(1) Land, when platted and incorporated as a
part of a town, loses its identity as a part of a mill site. Therefore, a deed to a mill site would not include such land.
(2) A sheriff's deed can only convey the property which
belongs, at the time, to the judgment debtor. When land has
been previously sold for taxes, there can be no right to possession under a sheriff's deed.
Judgment reversed.
OF-WHEN-No. 12706-People et al
vs. Mitchell et a!-Decided October 7, 1930.
Facts.-The plaintiff, Youst, and defendant, Mitchell,
were designees for the nomination of County commissioner
at the Republican primary. Mitchell was declared to be nominated and Youst sought to contest the election, alleging that a
mistake was made in the count, and that a recount would reELECTIONS -CONTEST

DICTA

sult in his, Youst's, nomination. The defendant's demurrer to
the complaint was sustained and the plaintiff alleged error.
Held.-A proper basis must be laid before ballot boxes
will be opened. The grounds for the contest of an election
must be specifically set out.
Judgment affirmed.

Compliments of

-Browvn Palace Hotel
THE CASCADE
Denver's Most ProgressiveLaundry
1847 Market Street

.'.

TAbor 6379

JEWELS OF INDIVIDUALITY

JOS. I. SCHWARTZ
Maker and Retailer of Quality _7ewelry for Over Forty Years
633 SIXTEENTH

STREET

32

DICTA

A PRAYER FOR FREEDOM
After filing a divorce complaint, a Denver attorney discovered that the prayer was that "the bounds of matrimony
be dissolved". He is still wondering what would have been
the status of his client had the prayer been granted as made.
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